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Words by Convention 
Gail Leckie and Robert Williams1 
 
A long-established project in the philosophy of language is the search for a reductive 
naturalistic metasemantics.  Reductive metasemantics ground target semantic facts - such as 
the fact that the word type “cat” refers to cats - in a non-semantic base.2  Existing reductive 
projects presuppose that word- (or sentence-) types like “cat” - are part of the non-semantic 
base.  They presuppose the availability of an exogenous theory of word types, that is, one that 
is prior to and independent of the metasemantics.3  This paper argues that an exogenous 
account of word types is unlikely to succeed.  We propose a new strategy: an endogenous 
account of word types, that is, one where word types are fixed as part of the metasemantics.  
In particular, we show how a metasemantic account on the lines of Lewis’ account in terms 
of conventions of truthfulness and trust can provide an endogenous account of words suited 
to a naturalistic metasemantics.  We say that it is the conventions of truthfulness and trust that 
ground not only the meaning of the words (meaning by convention) but also what the word 
type is of each particular token utterance (words by convention). 
 
We begin by explaining why existing exogenous theories of word types ill-serve the 
metasemantic project (section 1).  We then detail how a Lewisian metasemantics in terms of 
conventions of trust and truthfulness would use an exogenous theory of words (section 2), 
before adapting that metasemantics to give an endogenous theory of words in terms of 
conventions (section 3).  In section 4, we show that our endogenous account deals well with 
the problem cases we earlier identified for exogenous accounts of words.  Finally we raise the 
potential problem of overgeneration of words for our account (section 5) and show that 
Lewis’ account of convention already has the resources to prevent such overgeneration 
(section 6).   
 
1. 
																																								 																				
1	 The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the 
European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007-2013) / ERC Grant Agreement n. 312938. [other 
acknowledgments].	
2 We use quote marks variously to pick out word and sentence types, orthographic types and particular token 
utterances.  We hope it is clear which use is in play on a particular occasion. 
3 For example, Lewis (1983), Evans (1973), Davidson (1973), Horwich (1998).  By contrast, Millikan (1984) 
and Richard (1990) may intend something more like what we call an endogenous theory of word types.     
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 As an example of a metasemantic theory that requires an exogenous account of words, 
consider a simple version of a dominant causal source account, modelled on Evans (1973). 
Where u is a token utterance, x is an object or property, y is a word-type,  
 
(Toy Evans) u refers to x iff u is of type y and x is the dominant causal source of 
tokenings of the type y.   
 
Notice that (Toy Evans), like most metasemantic theories, specifies how features of the word 
type fix a word token’s semantic features.4  To say what the meaning is of a specific token, u, 
we need to know its type.  For example, Peta’s utterance on 1/1/1850 “I’ve visited 
Madagascar” refers to whatever is the dominant causal source of tokens of that type 
“Madagascar” which Peta tokened.  Evans says that the dominant causal source of the word-
type “Madagascar” is the island and so Peta’s token refers to that island, not the mainland.   
 
 How are we to use a metasemantic theory, such as (Toy Evans), in our naturalistic 
project?  We must establish that all the terms on the right-hand side of the biconditional are 
legitimate parts of the nonsemantic naturalistic base.  It is fair to assume that the island is a 
legitimate part of the base, as is the noise which is Peta’s utterance.  What about word types? 
Are these a legitimate part of the non-semantic base?  To show that they are, an advocate of 
(Toy Evans) would need a naturalistic account of word types; and likewise for other 
metasemantic theories that give the semantics of tokens in terms of their word type. There are 
two extant naturalistic accounts of word types – phonographemic and Kaplanian.5  We show 
that both generate counterintuitive predictions about what utterances are of the same type.  
This matters because those counterintuitive typings look likely to deliver undesirable 
semantics once plugged into any particular metasemantics.   
 
 The default picture of words in the philosophical literature is based on phonetic and 
																																								 																				
4 We lack space to consider theories which provide metasemantic accounts for individual tokens directly without 
appealing to word types.     
5	The metasemantic theories we are considering require a metaphysics of public words since their target is  
shared languages, not idiolects.  For this reason we do not consider lexemes, construed as the individual’s typing 
on expressions. 	
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orthographic similarity.6  Where u and v are token utterances, 
 
(Phonographemic) u and v are tokens of the same word iff they are spelt or pronounced 
the same. 
 
Words are maximal equivalence classes of tokens in the same-word relation.7  So the word 
type “Madagascar” might be the equivalence class of all tokens that are spelt M-A-D-A-G-A-
S-C-A-R etc, or all tokens sounded /ˌmadəˈɡaskə/. Let’s call this the phonographemic 
conception.8   
 
 The phonographemic account types word counterintuitively.  Sometimes, it is too fine-
grained, typing separately what are intuitively tokens of the same word type.  At other times, 
it is too coarse-grained, typing together what are intuitively tokens of different word.  In 
itself, counterintuitiveness is not strong evidence against the phonographemic account.  It 
would be if we were performing descriptive conceptual analysis on the folk concept word.  
But there is no reason to take folk intuitions about the extension of “word” as revealing the 
extension of the natural kind that is of significance to semantics and metasemantics.  Rather, 
counterintuitive typings are problematic in so far as, once plugged into particular 
metasemantic accounts, they deliver crazy semantic assignments.   
 
 Where an exogenous theory of words is intuitively too fine-grained, it provides an 
impoverished input for the metasemantic theory. It misses relevant tokens from the word type 
of an utterance u.  Accordingly, the metasemantic theory the exogenous theory feeds into 
misses facts relevant to the meaning of utterances of u.  If the input is sufficiently 
impoverished, the metasemantic theory has too little to go on and delivers no determinate 
meaning for u.  If the input is selectively impoverished, the metasemantics may assign u a 
meaning but one that is incompatible with any plausible semantic theory.   
 
 On the other hand, exogenous theories that are too coarse-grained contaminate the input 
																																								 																				
6 For example, Stebbings (1935); Davidson (1979) p. 90; Haack, (1978) p. 75.  Cappelen 1999 and Cappelen 
and Dever 2001 propose a more sophisticated version of the phonographemic approach.   
7 That is, tokens of a word are all same-word related and there are no ways to merge these equivalence classes to 
produce larger equivalence classes whose members are all same word related.   
8 Hawthorne and LePore (2011) call this the form-theoretic conception.  It is part of the view that Kaplan (1990) 
critiques under the name ‘the orthographic conception.’ 
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to the metasemantic theory.   When the metasemantics determines the meaning of u, it 
contaminates facts that do bear on the meaning of u - those about other tokens of intuitively 
the same type as u - with facts that don’t – those about tokens of an intuitively separate word 
type(s).  This may render the meaning of u indeterminate or skew its meaning towards what 
is intuitively the meaning of the other ‘word type’.   
 
 Consider some examples.  There are two ways that the phonographemic conception 
cuts too fine and impoverishes the input to the metasemantic theory.  (Phonographemic) does 
not group any distinct sounds and spelling types together.  Yet, sometimes an intuitively 
unitary word type has instances with various spellings (“realize”/“realise”) or various 
pronunciations (“tomato”).  The phonographemic account also counterintuitively counts 
instances of M-A-D-A-G-A-S-C-A-R and of /ˌmadəˈɡaskə/ as two distinct ‘words’.  This 
opens up the risk that the various phonemes and graphemes are assigned different meanings 
by the metasemantics and the risk that the input to the metasemantic theory for any grapheme 
or phoneme is so impoverished as to fail to generate the correct meaning for tokens of it.  
Suppose, for example, that what we would ordinarily think of the word “okapi” is uttered 
once and only once in the distinctive North Welsh accent. The class of tokens phonetically 
exactly similar to that utterance may be a singleton.  Further suppose that the single North 
Welsh token was uttered in front of a muddy zebra’s backside, not an actual okapi.  Plugging 
the phonographemic account of names into (Toy Evans) now delivers crazy results.  (Toy 
Evans) directs us to the dominant causal source of the word type and since the type is a 
singleton, it directs to the causal source of that particular token – the zebra.  
 
  (Phonographemic) also cuts more coarsely than the typing that gives the desired input 
into the metasemantic theory.  For example, far-flung tokens of the grapheme C-O-W, traced 
out by by aliens on Mars, ought not to determine the semantics of Earth tokens of that 
grapheme C-O-W.  That would contaminate the input to the metasemantics.   Even within a 
language, tokens of a single grapheme don’t always have the same meanings - consider 
lexical ambiguity.  For example, tokens spelt B-A-N-K sometimes bear information about 
financial institutions and sometimes about the edges of rivers.  The watery tokens ought not 
to determine the semantics of the financial tokens.  Once more, (Toy Evans) will struggle to 
deliver the right semantic results for such ‘words’ since the counterintuitive typing skews 
what is the dominant causal source of the type.   This typing might leave it indeterminate 
whether a token of B-A-N-K is the financial kind or the watery kind. In other cases, the 
5	
	
causal source of the additional tokens will outweigh the dominant causal source of local 
tokens of that phonographeme.    
 
 Going disjunctive might mitigate this concern. Perhaps we could say that a disjunctive 
property can be the dominant causal source of a word.   We might try to say that B-A-N-K 
has a disjunctive property as its extension: is-a-riverbank-or-a-financial bank.  However, 
these referential assignments are likely to cause trouble for the semantics of whole sentences 
once combined with a compositional semantics.  We do not want “There are three banks” to 
come out as true in cases where there are at most two river banks and one financial bank.9   
  
 It is tempting to resolve the problem of coarse-grainedness by distinguishing two words 
with the same spelling and pronunciation but which are different words in virtue of their 
different meanings.10    
 
(Plus Semantic) u and v are tokens of the same word iff they have the same meaning 
and the same phonographemic features. 
 
Again, words are maximal classes of tokens in the same word relation.  (Plus Semantic) rules 
that there are two homonyms spelt B-A-N-K and so we might hope to get a different 
dominant causal source of each by (Toy Evans).  However, (Toy Evans) can’t be combined 
with (Plus Semantic) on pain of circularity.  The account of word types can’t appeal to 
notions which the metasemantic theory is supposed to ground naturalistically.     
  
 The phonographemic account of words is not the only one on offer.  Kaplan offers a 
different exogenous account of word type.  He takes two word tokens to be of the same type 
iff they are in an appropriate causal relation to one another.  The paradigm appropriate causal 
relation is intended repetition.  Not all tokens of B-A-N-K need be tokens of the same word, 
provided they fail to be related by chains of intended repetition.  Conversely, other pairs of 
																																								 																				
9Going disjunctive brings other problems for the Evansian.  Some tokens of the intuitive word “cow” have their 
source in horses, and yet we do not want any such token to mean horse.  To avoid the horse/cow problem, it is 
tempting to build in a condition that disadvantages disjunctions as dominant causal sources.   
10 Many text books, such as Larson and Segal (1995) treat ambiguity as a syntactic phenomenon so that “bank” 
corresponds to two words.  Plausibly, this move requires words to be individuated partially in semantic terms.   
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tokens that are spelt or pronounced differently - for example, “realize” and “realise” – are in 
the right sort of relation.   
 
Since Kaplan’s account has never been spelt out in detail, it’s difficult to assess.  
However, it, too, types words counterintuitively in ways that are likely to cause trouble for 
any metasemantic theories reliant on it.  Kaplan’s account cuts too coarsely in cases like the 
following.  Suppose Xena produces a token /treɪn/ in attempting to convey that she is a train-
engineer, which Zara mishears and then repeats as /dreɪn/, forming and passing on the belief 
that Xena is a drain-engineer.  Xena and Zara’s tokens /treɪn/ and /dreɪn/ would count by 
Kaplan’s lights as tokens of the same word since Zara intentionally repeats Xena’s utterance.  
Zara’s friends and relations go on to repeat her utterance in the context of discussions of 
plumbing. Such tokens count as the same word as Zara’s /dreɪn/ tokening, but also by 
transitivity, as the same word as Xena’s /treɪn/ tokening.  The danger is that we lose the 
obvious fact that there are two word-types in play here.  Inter alia, this plays havoc in 
identifying a single dominant causal source, as required by (Toy Evans).11  As with the 
phonographemic account, it is tempting to get the intuitively right word typing by adding a 
semantic element to the account.  We want to count only those intentional-repetition-links 
that preserve meaning, in order to identify a tradition of usages focused on conveying 
information about a single subject-matter. But a reductive metasemantics can’t, on pain of 
circularity, make use of an exogenous account of words that contains semantic elements.   
 
 What have we shown so far?  Phonographemic and Kaplanian views attempt to offer 
an account of word types that is separate from, and independent of, the main metasemantic 
account. We have established problems with combining these views of the metaphysics of 
words with (Toy Evans).  At this point, one project is to retain the architecture: 
metasemantics underpinned by an exogenous theory of word types, and to show how the 
difficulties identified above can be resolved by more sophisticated development of the 
component theories. However, we think that it is a mistake to assume that the overall theory 
will have this architecture. What follows illustrates an alternative, on which word-typing and 
semantic facts are settled simultaneously and the word-types are endogenous to the 
																																								 																				
11 Another type of case where Kaplan’s account cuts more coarsely than an intuitive typing of words is the case 
of substantial but gradual phonetic, graphemic and semantic change, including cases with fission structure but 
we lack space to discuss such cases.   
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metasemantics. Our illustration of an endogenous theory will use a Lewisian metasemantics, 
though the endogenous strategy could potentially be deployed in other frameworks.12      
 
2. 
 
In this section, we describe the metasemantic theory – Lewis’ – that we will be 
adapting into an endogenous account (in section 3).  We start by recapping Lewis’ own 
metasemantic story in terms of conventions of truth and trust.  Lewis himself seems to be 
working with an exogenous phonographemic picture of word types.  He says language 
assigns meaning to “certain strings of types of sounds or marks” (Lewis 1983 p163). The 
exogenous theories already canvassed turn out to cause problems for Lewis similar to the 
ones afflicting (Toy Evans).  
 
In “Language and Languages” Lewis says that languages, in the sense of abstract 
semantic theories, are functions from sentences to meanings. 13  Grammars are, inter alia, 
functions from the public lexicon (a generalisation of the category word types) to meanings 
which recursively generate the functions from sentences to meanings.   The job of a 
metasemantic account is to lay down conditions, in an illuminating, non-circular way, as to 
which of these abstract grammars and languages is in use by a population.    
 
Lewis’ metasemantic theory says that a certain language L is correct for that 
population if the conventions of truthfulness and trust for L prevail for that population P.  A 
convention of truthfulness for a sentence type s, connecting it to the proposition p, is a 
regularity in usage—that members of the population utter tokens of s only if they believe that 
p—where this regularity is entrenched in the beliefs and desires of the community in a 
distinctive convention-forming way. A convention of trust, likewise, is a conventional 
regularity of having or forming a belief that p upon hearing someone else utter s. A grammar 
is correct if it is the best axiomatic theory among those which generate that correct language.   
 
In more detail, a regularity R is a convention in a population P iff within P, the 
																																								 																				
12 One author takes the fact that we can develop a successful endogenous version of Lewisian metasemantics as 
evidence for Lewisian metasemantics.  However, it may be possible to develop endogenous versions of 
interpretationist and inferentialist metasemantics to rival the endogenous Lewisian account.   
13 Lewis 1983 pp163-188  
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following hold, with at most a few exceptions: 
(1) Everyone in P conforms to R.   
(2) Everyone in P believes that everyone in P conforms to R. 
(3) This belief gives everyone in P a good reason to conform to R himself. 
(4) There is a general preference in P for general conformity to R rather than slightly-
less-than-general conformity to R 
(5) There is an alternative possible regularity R’ such that if it met (1) and (2), it 
would also meet (3) and (4) 
(6) All of (1-5) are common knowledge. 
To repeat, the specific conventional regularities that make an abstract language L used in 
population P are as follows, where s ranges over sentence types and p over propositions, 
 
(Truthfulness) Members of P utter s only if they believe p, where L(s)=p.  
 
(Trust) If a member of P hears another member of P utter s, she tends to come to 
believe p, where L(s)=p. 
 
(Lewis) summarizes the metasemantic theory: 
 
(Lewis) Given an exogenously fixed specification of population P1 and typing of 
sentences, T1, L is the language of P1 for T1 iff there are conventions of (Truthfulness) 
and (Trust) in L in P1 for T1. 
 
This highlights that if (Lewis) is to provide a naturalistic metasemantic theory, it must be 
supplemented by exogenous theories of populations and word types.14 However, we’ve seen 
reason to doubt that the available exogenous accounts of word types will serve.  As before, an 
exogenous account with semantic elements is circular.   As before, combining a 
metasemantic account with an exogenous account that cuts too finely, such as 
(phonographemic) causes havoc in the semantics.  For example, in the “okapi” case, either 
																																								 																				
14 It must also be supplemented by the contents of the beliefs of members of that population.  Lewis’ theory is 
then, ‘headfirst’: the intensional content of mental states is presupposed in the characterization of semantic 
content. The authors of this paper differ in their enthusiasm for granting this headfirst presupposition.       
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the convention covering those tokens is one that ties them to zebras or there are too few 
tokens of the ‘word’ for there to be any convention.    
 
We will use the remainder of this section to show why overly coarse-grained accounts 
are problematic in combination with (Lewis).  Because of the complexities and flexibility of 
Lewis’ account, this will take some time.  Fortunately, the work here will also be useful in 
defending our own account in section 6.   
 
Overly coarse grained accounts of words obscure the differences between word 
tokens with intuitively different semantic values and thereby conflate what should be separate 
streams of input to the metasemantic theory.  For example, tokens that are intuitively about 
financial institutions/trains are bundled in with those intuitively about waterway edges/drains.  
We focus on case of “bank” but similar reasoning could be applied to the “train”/”drain” 
case.  Call the phonographemic string “There is a bank nearby” sentence type s1.  Which 
language and grammar can capture the conventional regularities for s1 for English speakers?  
The problem is that sometimes a speaker produces s1 when she believes there is a financial 
institution nearby; but other times she does so when she believes there is a river edge nearby.  
Sometimes hearing s1 inclines a hearer to adopt the one belief and sometimes the other.   
Which grammars and which languages match those regularities while treating all instances of 
the phonographemic string as, counterintuitively, a single sentence type?  A grammar that 
associates “bank” with only financial banks will not suffice, nor will one that associates it 
with only river banks.  There are three ways that Lewis could address this problem: the 
disjunctive method, the sequence method and the indexical method.  We’ll show none of 
them renders the phonographemic account suitable as an exogenous plug-in for Lewis’ 
metasemantics.   
 
We start with the disjunctive method.  Let the grammar Gd pair “bank” with a function 
from the union of the set of financial banks and the set of river banks to true.  So, each 
sentence containing “bank” is paired with a belief that has disjunctive content. Suppose 
further that Gd includes the usual rules of composition.  Gd pairs s1 with a proposition of the 
form [there is either a financial institution or the edge of a waterway near to x] where x is a 
place provided by context.  This might capture the regularities of English for s1.  However, 
such a theory will struggle to get the right regularities for phonographemic strings of the form 
“There are three banks”.  This is uttered when there are either three financial institutions or 
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three river banks; not when there are three things that are either financial institutions or river 
banks as the conventions of Gd require.  In such cases, the disjunctive method delivers the 
wrong semantics. An analogous problem afflicted (Toy Evans).  
 
Lewis’ own approach to ambiguity is to pair each sentence s with a sequence of 
propositions <p, q….>, instead of pairing it with a single proposition.  The truthfulness 
convention is a conventional regularity of uttering s only if one believes p, or believes q, or 
….  The trust convention is a conventional regularity of believing p or believing q or … if 
one hears another member of the population utter s.   According to this proposal, “the bank is 
nearby” is paired with the sequence: <the financial bank is nearby, the riverbank is nearby>.   
Call this the gruesome sequence regularity.  “There are three banks” is paired with the 
sequence <there are three financial banks, there are three river banks.>   Lewis does not 
describe a grammar that generates such sequences.  Perhaps he has in mind a grammar Gs that 
associates words with sequences of referents, with each sentence s then mapped to sequences 
of all those propositions that are determined compositionally from some selection of referents 
from the list associated by Gs with the constituent words of s. For example, “bank” will be 
associated with the list <financial bank, river bank>.  Call this the sequence method. If Gs 
does pair “there are three banks” with the extensionally appropriate sequences, it avoids the 
problems of the disjunctive method. 
 The sequence method also fails.  The problem is that the gruesome sequence 
regularity is not a convention.  To be sure, there is a regularity of uttering “the bank is 
nearby” either when one believes that the financial bank is nearby or believes the riverbank is 
nearby, and a regularity of coming to believe one of those propositions when one hears the 
sentence uttered. But for the gruesome sequence regularity to be a convention, Lewis’s 
condition (3) requires that our awareness of that regularity gives us reason to conform to it. It 
does not.  Suppose you hear someone utter “the bank is nearby”. Awareness of the gruesome 
sequence regularity gives you reason to believe that either the speaker believes a riverbank to 
be nearby, or believes a financial bank to be nearby. If you assume the speaker is reliable, this 
gives you reason to believe the disjunction: either a riverbank or financial bank is nearby. But 
believing the disjunction is not to conform to the gruesome sequence regularity of trust. To 
do that, one would have to believe one or other of the disjuncts.    
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Turn now to the indexical method.  Here is one way of fitting indexicals into a 
Lewisian account.15 Pair sentences with characters, functions from context to ‘horizontal’ 
content. While there’s no horizontal proposition p such that every speaker will utter “I am 
standing” only if they believe p, all speakers satisfy the following: they will try to only utter 
“I am standing” (in c) when they believe whatever proposition which is the value of that 
sentence’s character C at c; likewise, they will all try to respond to utterances of that 
sentence-type (in c) by forming the belief in the same proposition. An example of such a 
conventional regularity is: utter “I am standing” only if A is the speaker, and one believes that 
A is standing. Notice that a speaker can use awareness of this regularity to give them reason 
to believe an appropriate formulation of trust: for they combine their awareness of the general 
regularity with the publically available information about which context they’re in (who the 
speaker is) and, if they take the speaker to be reliable, they’ll have reason to believe that that 
individual is standing, and so to conform to the regularity.  
One could try co-opting that treatment of indexicals to the case of “bank”.  On the 
indexical method, the convention would associate “bank” not with a sequence of 
propositions, but with a function from contexts to propositions.  The putative regularity 
would be that a speaker would only utter “the bank is nearby” when financial banks is the 
salient disambiguation of “bank” and they believe that the financial bank is nearby or 
riverbanks are the salient disambiguation of “bank” and they believe the riverbank is nearby. 
Belief in these regularities combines with knowledge of context to provide reasons to 
conform to the analogous regularity of trust just as it does for standard indexicals.  Call the 
relevant regularities the gruesome indexical regularities.   
One problem for the indexical method is how to keep the base free of semantic facts 
in line with our reductive ambitions. The gruesome indexical regularities build in the “salient 
disambiguation of words” as part of context, where the account of context is an exogenous 
account plugged into the reductive metasemantic account. But what makes a disambiguation 
salient depends in large part on the linguistic context in which the word appears (e.g. whether 
mortgages or boating was mentioned most recently). “Salient disambiguation” is a 
																																								 																				
15 A different interpretation of Lewis uses the (later) distinction between horizontal and diagonal content.  
(When A is the speaker, the horizontal content of “I am sitting” is that A is sitting; the diagonal content is that 
the speaker of the context is sitting). Diagonal contents of sentences are a candidate for the narrow content of 
beliefs ascribed using those sentences. This might well serve for true indexicals. But the analogue of diagonal 
content for ambiguous sentences would be highly recherché, and it’s implausible that ordinary competent use of 
“bank” requires one to form beliefs with that content.     
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smokescreen for sneaking in illicit appeal to the semantic.  Upon examination, this particular 
indexical account is no less circular than helping oneself to semantically-individuated words 
at the outset.16,   
A problem for all three methods of dealing with overly coarse-grained words – 
disjunctive, sequence and indexical - is that, even if they identify regularities of truthfulness 
and trust for a population, these regularities are not conventions because they do not meet 
condition (3) – they do not reflect our reasons for continued conformity.  We postpone 
explaining this problem until section 6. 
 The exogenous version of Lewis’s theory—Lewis’s own approach—is no more 
promising than (Toy Evans). We will now adjust the Lewisian metasemantics to provide a 
positive, endogenous metaphysics of word-types.17   
 
3.  
 
Let a language be a triple of a population P, a typing relation T and a function L from 
sentence types to propositions.  The population is a set of time-slices of people.18 The typing 
relation is a set of sets s1...sn where each si is a set of actual and possible token utterances.  T 
should impose a typing on each of the utterances of members of P.  L is a function from those 
sentence types s1..sn and only those sentence types to propositions.   
 
 If languages are triples of this sort, how do the conventional regularities of 
truthfulness and trust fix which of those languages is the one in use for a particular utterance 
u?  We replace (Lewis) with (Endogenous).  
 
(Endogenous) Given an utterance u, 
<P, T, L> is a language in use in utterance u iff P is a population and T a 
																																								 																				
16 This is not to deny that one can specify other features of context non-semantically e.g. the speaker, time, place 
of the utterance. 
17 Of course, Lewis’ approach may need other refinements.  For example, Lewis considers objections to his 
approach relating to liars and non-literal utterances in his 1983 pp163-188.  But in these cases, any responses 
open to Lewis are also open to our endogenous account.  The aim of our paper is to only to explore an example 
of theory of words endogenous to some metasemantics and show it fares better than the exogenous version of 
that metasemantics.  
18 Populations must be sets of time-slices of people in order to allow division of the utterances of people who are 
bilingual. 
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typing relation relative to which there are conventions of (Truthfulness) and 
(Trust) in L, and the speaker/hearer of u is a member of the population P; and 
u is a member of some equivalence class of the typing relation T.  
Instead of determining L after fixing a particular population and typing relation, 
(Endogenous) treats the population and typing relation as variables whose values are fixed 
however is necessary to produce conventions of (Truthfulness) and (Trust).19    
 
If P is to count as language-using population, the members of P have to be able to 
think about population P, and think about the sentence types T induces, in order to have the 
belief that the relevant regularities prevail among P. This is not a problem for (Endogenous), 
as the way that speakers think about P and about S is fairly unconstrained. For example, 
suppose that each member has an unstructured name-like concept (“Us”) and each believes 
that every one of Us follows the relevant regularity. Suppose also they have an unstructured 
concept “sentence-of” whose referent is a function from utterances to types, which features in 
the specification of the relevant regularities. What the account requires, in order for <P,T,L> 
to satisfy (Endogenous), is that these unstructured concepts “Us” and “sentence-of” refer to 
the right things (P, and the function induced by T, respectively). Why be pessimistic about 
this issue? One might think it problematic if one assumed that members of P think about P 
and T descriptively, via some implicit exogenous theory of populations or sentence-types. But 
why restrict speakers to descriptive concepts of P and T?  
 
4. 
 
Notice that (Endogenous) makes space for languages where words are typed so as to 
have the extension specified by the phonographemic or Kaplanian accounts, just as long as 
those types do in fact feature in conventions of the right sort.  The considerations earlier are 
reasons to think they won’t feature in suitable conventions for languages such as English. But 
nothing in the form of the endogenous account rules them out.   
 
The endogenous account is highly flexible, making room for words to be typed so as 
																																								 																				
19	While population and word-typing are fixed endogenously by our new metasemantic account, we still 
presuppose that there are exogenous naturalistic accounts available for other entities, in particular, the sounds 
and marks that comprise the utterance tokens.	
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to avoid the overly coarse or overly fine graining we saw in extant exogenous accounts.  
(Endogenous) makes room for word types to have the extensions which (Plus Semantic) and 
the indexical method were reaching for (again, provided those groupings of tokens feature in 
some conventions of the right sort). Nothing prevents us from giving an informative 
specification of the extension of word-types that appeals to semantic facts, so long as this is 
not construed as part of a reductive metaphysics. 
 
In particular, (Endogenous) makes room for a satisfactory treatment of cases that 
phonographemic typed too finely.  On (Lewis), the grapheme “realise” needs a different 
convention from the grapheme “realize” since words are typed phonographemically.  By 
contrast, (Endogenous) permits a typing that groups these together as tokens of one word.  
(Endogenous) also addresses the problem of word-types with too few instances to support 
conventional regularities. The single pronunciation of “okapi” in a North Welsh accent can be 
lumped together with pronunciations in other accents.     
 What about cases that the phonographemic account typed too coarsely, such as the 
“bank” case?  (Endogenous) allows the language to feature a typing relation T that types 
some utterances such as B-A-N-K as of the word type “bank1” and others of the type “bank2”.  
With two words, the language can have a grammar featuring a non-disjunctive regularity, 
pairing “bank1” with the function from riverbanks to True and a separate non-disjunctive 
regularity pairing “bank2” with the function from financial banks to True.  In a case where 
there are at most two riverbanks and one high street bank, “there are three banks” will come 
out false as desired, avoiding the problem that faced the disjunctive method.  (Endogenous) 
also avoids the problem that faced the sequence method.  There are regularities of 
truthfulness and trust governing respectively the types “there is a bank1 nearby” and “there is 
a bank2 nearby”, speakers utter the first only when they believe there’s a riverbank nearby, 
and the second when they believe there’s a financial bank nearby, and form the appropriate 
beliefs when they hear the respective utterances. A speaker’s reason to obey (Truthfulness) 
for the sentence featuring bank2 is her knowledge that her interlocutors conform to (Trust) for 
that sentence.  So unlike the sequence method, the regularities in (Endogenous) meet 
condition (3) for conventions.  Finally, although the typing reflects semantic features of the 
token sentences, this does not result in circularity.  The indexical method was embroiled in 
circularity only because it was part of an exogenous theory.  Since we do not attempt to 
characterise T prior to the semantics, there is no circularity.   
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(Endogenous) also makes populations endogenous to the metasemantic theory.  This 
answers an objection White (ms) raises against Lewis’ metasemantics.  White gives reason to 
doubt that there is a principled non-semantic exogenous account of a population.  The 
speakers of a language are not exactly those within certain geographical boundaries in certain 
time periods or those of certain nationalities.  Nor can we identify the population as those 
who speak a certain language if the population is to be given prior to the semantic theory.   
Our endogenous approach gives a principled line on what will count as a language-using 
population: a language speaker population is any group for which there are conventional 
regularities of truthfulness and trust.  So our approach rescues Lewis from White’s objection. 
 
5. 
 
 Although we have made room for new typings of utterance tokens, this will be no 
good if it comes at the cost of removing too many constraints, leaving us with an account that 
lets in crazy typings along with the desirable ones, thereby letting in crazy semantics along 
with the desired semantics.  In this section, we suggest prima facie ways to gerrymander such 
crazy languages.  Fortunately, in section 6, we can rule out that these gerrymanders are 
genuine languages - although they may characterise genuine regularities of truthfulness and 
trust, those regularities are not conventions.  
 
We will consider three ways our opponents might try to gerrymander spurious 
languages from intuitively correct semantic theories – by restriction, by merging, by tailoring.  
Begin with restriction.  If a regularity prevails among the whole population, it also prevails 
among subpopulations.  One can gerrymander spurious languages (it seems) by taking the 
intuitively correct semantic theory and restricting the population.  The restricted 
subpopulation could be arbitrary, or it could be based on some recognizable feature. For an 
example of the latter, take English but restrict the population to the brown-eyed subset of the 
original population (counting those with other colours of eyes as a separate linguistic 
population).   Relatedly, there are ways to subdivide the typing relation while preserving 
regularities of truth and trust. For example, take English but double the number of types of 
word, counting whispered and non-whispered tokens always as of different words.  
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A second method to produce gerrymandered types and languages is merging.  One 
trick is to merge what are intuitively distinct but synonymous word types into a single 
gerrymandered word type.  For example, type tokens of the graphemes “cell” and “mobile” 
together as if they were different graphemic realisations of the same word.  Another 
gerrymander merges tokens of the graphemes “purchase” and “buy” together.  Merged 
gerrymanders keep the structure of regularities in place, simply collapsing two regularities 
from intuitive language(s) into a single regularity in the merged gerrymander.  For that 
reason, merged gerrymanders would produce the same meaning assignments as the intuitively 
correct semantic theory that they are based on.   
 
Another trick merges tokens which are intuitively of distinct non-synonymous word 
types.  An example groups all tokenings of “there are oranges in the fruit bowl” together with 
one person’s tokenings of “there are fish in the sea”, counting these as instances of a single 
type. A more natural version would count tokenings of the same phonographemic type as of 
the same word-type across geographical or historical semantic drift. For example, “pants” 
picks out an external leg-covering among speakers from one geographic region, an 
undergarment among those from another.   
How should non-synonymous mergers specify the candidate regularity of 
truthfulness/trust to cover disparate usage of the two non-synonyms? To get the right 
semantics, one would have to treat the merged ‘word type’ as ambiguous.  We discussed 
three methods of dealing with ambiguity in section 3 – the disjunctive, sequence or indexical 
method. (In essence, treating homophones like “bank” as a single type is also a merge relative 
to the two non-synonymous but phonographemically identical types.).  We showed in section 
3 that the disjunctive and sequence methods are unsuitable.  However, we could treat merged 
words as indexical provided the relevant aspects of context are not semantic as we argued 
they were for homophones like “bank”. For the orange/fish merge the relevant feature of 
context is whether the token was uttered by a particular person and this is not problematically 
semantic.  For “pants”, that contextual feature might be the accent of the speaker.   
Restriction and merging (under the indexical treatment) in general do not generate 
unwanted assignments of truth-conditions to any token utterances.   By contrast, our final 
kind of spurious typings - tailored typings -  don’t only produce spurious types; they also 
threaten to overgenerate meaning assignments to tokens. Tailoring involves tweaking the 
boundaries of standard types, so as to alter the semantic assignments to particular utterances. 
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Arbitary tweaking is not guaranteed to produce regularities.  But here’s a prescription for 
gerrymandering genuine regularities: find utterances which are exceptions to the regularities 
of what is intuitively the correct semantics, then adjust the population or sentence typing so 
that they are no longer exceptions to the rule that covers them.      
 
Here is a first example of tailoring - the red tailor.  Consider a biased selection P* of 
the population who are apt to call more orangey things “red” than is the norm. Suppose P* 
are scattered among the rest of the intuitive population of English speakers.  Now consider a 
gerrymandered typing of words, “red1” and “red2”, the first tokened exclusively by members 
of P* when interacting with other members of P*, the other tokened on the remainder of the 
occasions. By construction, there will be regularities of truthfulness and trust among P* 
linking “that is red1” to a belief that the item in question is red*, where red* is a colour that 
includes orangey non-red shades. Insofar as we concentrate on the whole population and the 
standard typing of “red”, the “red” tokens uttered by members of P* will mean red; but 
insofar as we concentrate on the gerrymander P*/ “red1” those very tokens will also mean 
that is red* (in a distinct language).    
 
For a second example, consider utterances where the speaker intended to produce the 
phoneme /treɪn/ but the phonetic intention failed and she produced a different phoneme, 
/dreɪn/.  Perhaps many such utterances are misheard as /treɪn/ by the audience, a common 
mistake, given expectations set up by the conversational context.  Call these the fluffed 
tokens.  Intuitively the fluffed tokens are instances of the word “drain”, not “train”. 
Accordingly, the standard semantic theory treats sentences involving the fluffed tokens as 
exceptions to the truth and trust regularities linking “drain” and beliefs about drains.  (Lewis) 
and (Endogenous) permit this - regularities need not be perfect.  But our opponents can retype 
the fluffed tokens (which sound /dreɪn/) with tokens that sound /treɪn/.  Call this word-type 
“train+”.  There are regularities linking “train+” to beliefs about trains, which both the tokens 
sounding /treɪn/ and the fluffed tokens confirm.      
 
Malaprops too are susceptible to tailoring.  Suppose Mrs Malaprop says, “Aviators are 
dangerous reptiles found in the marshes in Florida.”  On the intuitive semantic interpretation, 
Mrs Malaprop says something false about people who fly planes, even if her audience can 
work out what truth she intended to convey.  Our opponents tailor a gerrymander – the 
malaprop tailor - out of Malaprop’s exception to the intuitive regularities.   Retype the first 
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token word in Malaprop’s utterance with tokens spelt and sounded like the intuitive word-
type “alligator” to produce a word type “alligator+”.  One can now subsume her utterance 
under a truthfulness regularity linking alligators and “alligator+”.  Perhaps Lydia hears Mrs 
Malaprop and takes her to believe that there are thousands of alligators.  If so, one can also 
subsume Mrs Malaprop’s utterance under a trust regularity.   
 
6. 
We have presented seven ways of gerrymandering word-types. There were two forms 
of restriction: either arbitrary (subtypes that do not correspond to features to which speaker-
hearers are sensitive) or recognizable (whispered vs. non-whispered, uttered by someone with 
brown vs. blue eyes); two forms of merging (of synonyms, e.g. “cell”/”mobile”, 
“buy”/”purchase”, or of non-synonyms under the indexical treatment); and three ways of 
tailoring the type (the red-tailor, favouring orange-biased usage, the fluff-tailor, reclassifying 
drain-utterances as train-utterances, and the malaprop-tailor, treating Malaprop’s aviator-
utterance as an alligator-utterance). These all articulate genuine regularities of truthfulness 
and trust connecting our utterances and attitudes.  
Fortunately, Lewis’ account of convention already contains within it countervailing 
pressures to rule out these gerrymanders. To be a convention, a regularity needs to do more 
than meet clause (1) of Lewis’s definition. Condition (3) requires that the populations’ beliefs 
that the regularity obtains must give them good reasons for conforming to it in future. We 
will argue that this means that types must be (i) identifiable; and (ii) must be psychologically 
present.  
 Restriction 
arb. 
 
recog. 
Merge 
syn. 
 
non-syn. 
Tailor 
red 
 
fluff 
 
malaprop 
Identifiable N    N   
Presence N N N N N N N 
 
The table summarizes what these constraints rule out.  Although psychological presence 
would suffice alone to rule out all gerrymanders from counting as actual languages, 
identifiability tells us something about what is a possible human language.  For this reason it 
can explain  why the phonographemic account of words seemed appealing.   
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Identifiability. To feature in a conventional regularity, sentence types and populations 
must be identifiable by speakers, in the sense that the speaker must have a generic capacity to 
tell that utterance u is of type s, or person a is in population P.  This falls out of (3)’s 
requirement that speakers employ beliefs about the type in reasoning.  (3) requires that the 
speaker-hearers’ awareness of the existence of the regularities of truthfulness and trust 
prevailing in their population give them reason (either epistemic or practical) to conform to 
those regularities.  Here, for illustration, is the schematic form of the epistemic reason to 
conform to a suitable instance of the trust regularity: 
a. There’s a regularity among P to utter type s only if they believe p. 
b. The speaker has uttered something of type s. 
c. The speaker is a member of P. 
So, 
d. The speaker believes p.  
 
Combined with standing presumptions of cooperation and expertise, this supports a 
conclusion of the form: 
e. p.  
(Similar reasoning applies on the practical side.)  For this sort of reasoning to be available to 
a hearer, she needs, in steps b and c, to identify which type a token she encounters falls under, 
and which population a person stage she encounters belongs to. If she can never do this, her 
belief in the truthfulness regularity never provides her with reason to conform to the trust 
regularity and (3) fails utterly. To be able to identify types and populations, she need not do 
so successfully in all cases.  For example, Zara misidentified Xena’s utterance of “train” but 
she still has the general ability to identify utterances of “train”.  However, given that in order 
for a regularity to be convention, (3) must be met with only a few exceptions, she must be 
able to identify types and populations with only a few exceptions.   
The identifiability point is general to all conventions.  Take the convention of driving 
on the left, when in Australia. There is therefore a regularity of driving on the left when in 
region R of Australia (and one of driving on the left when in the Australian complement of 
R). But if I can’t tell when I’m in region R, and when not, these subregularities can’t feature 
in my practical reasoning and if so, these regularities aren’t conventions.   
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The identifiability constraint rules out some of the gerrymanders from section 5. It 
immediately implies that arbitrary subpopulations (P1/P2) or arbitrary finer-grained typings 
of words (s1/s2) won’t feature in conventions, since speakers will not in general be able to 
identify when an utterance falls under s1 rather than s2, or an individual is in P1 rather than P2.  
The constraint also eliminates some examples of tailoring: speakers can’t tell who is biased 
towards orange in their “red” grapheme/phoneme utterances if P* is unidentifiable. As the 
table records, many gerrymanders are not ruled out by this constraint.  Recognisable 
restrictions, the malaprop and the fluff tailor and the various forms of merging, all pass the 
constraint.  
The identifiability constraint does admit the intuitive sentence-types and populations, 
as desired. The population of English speakers make distinctive noises and inscriptions that 
enable others in the group (with only occasional exceptions) to identify them as such.  Tokens 
of the intuitive word type “cat” are also identifiable as such, with the primary clue being their 
phonographemic features. Background knowledge plays an important mediating role in this 
identification: phonological features are combined with experience of the idiosyncratic 
variations of pronunciation across different accents or speech impediments to produce our 
ability to identify types. Other resources available to us in the identification task include non-
semantic conventions20 such as the explicit letter transformation conventions of braille and 
transliteration conventions, both of which apply regardless of semantics to any sentence type. 
This explains the initial appeal of an exogenous phonographemic account.  Phonographemic 
features are indeed important but they feature in the epistemology of type recognition, rather 
than the metaphysics of those types.  In the epistemology, they need only be defeasible 
evidence of word type.  This comfortably accommodates the holism and idiosyncrasy that 
blocked a metaphysical phonographemic account.   
Psychological presence. We take it that to be a convention, a regularity must be the 
content of the psychological reasons that members of a relevant population possess for acts of 
conformity to R.21 Given this, a genuine regularity R* can fail to meet (3) if it does not 
feature as the content of speakers’ reasons.   
																																								 																				
20 See Cappelen 1999 for discussion of such conventions.   
21 An alternative reading of (3), which we reject, is that the regularity should be a consideration that objectively 
counts in favour of future conformity to it, irrespective of whether it is psychologically present in the 
population.  The motivation for the objective reading is to avoid over-intellectualizing speakers by attributing to 
them explicit beliefs about the regularities.  However, the psychological view need only attribute implicit 
beliefs. 
21	
	
Again, there are illuminating precedents in driving conventions. First consider 
merging: From the base conventions, such as driving-left-in-Australia, we can construct 
merged regularities such as driving-left-when-in-Australia-and-driving-right-when-in-the-US. 
These merged regularities do not feature in agents’ psychological reasons for instances of 
left-driving in Australia. As evidence, notice which information agents take as relevant when 
deciding  which side of the road to drive on. The reason for and decision to drive on the left 
in Australia are resilient under various hypotheses about what happens elsewhere.  I don’t 
recheck my decision to drive-left-in-Australia if I discover that the US has altered its driving 
laws. This shows that the Australia specific regularity is operative in my reasons, not a 
merged regularity for both Australia and the US. 
Exactly the same goes for mergers of types for conventions of truthfulness and trust.  
We psychologically encode information about truthfulness and trust for tokens of “buy” and 
“purchase” separately. As evidence, notice that were I to learn that the meaning of “purchase” 
had shifted so as to be associated with the belief an item had been stolen, I would not regard 
my practice with “buy” as undermined. A fortiori, arbitrary mergers of non-synonymous 
words, such as “orange” and “fish” do not figure among my reasons for forming beliefs or 
uttering sentences. Equally, in a conversation between Americans, it doesn’t matter whether 
or not they know the British usage of “pants”. That shows that the US specific regularity 
rather than the merge of US and UK tokens of P-A-N-T-S is psychologically present.  We 
now have an additional reason to reject Lewis’ treatment of ambiguity from section 2.  It is 
the two separate bank1 and bank2 regularities that feature in our psychological reasons, not 
the disjunctive, indexical or sequence regularities featuring the phonographemic type B-A-N-
K.  Evidence is that the former but not the latter regularities are resilient.  If I get evidence 
that the regularity linking B-A-N-K to river banks is breaking down, it affects only my 
watery uses of B-A-N-K, not my financial ones.  In sum, presence knocks out the identifiable 
but gerrymandered mergers. 
Application of the presence constraint also rules out recognizable restrictions. Again, 
consider the driving convention analogue. From a base convention of driving-left-when-in-
Australia, we get restricted regularities of driving-left-when-in-a-big-car-in-Australia and 
driving-left-when-in-a-small-car-in-Australia. Here, the relevant psychological fact is that we 
are inclined to recheck our practical reasoning when in a big car, conditional on learning that 
behaviour with small cars is not as we thought it was. If our psychological reasons for drive-
left (in circumstances where we happen to be in a big car) were the big-car regularity, this 
22	
	
should not happen. 
The whispered/non-whispered restricted regularities are the analogues of this in the 
case of truthfulness and trust. If I learn that whispered tokens of “blue” are applied to slightly 
greener things than I had thought, I’m inclined to assume that this generalizes to non-
whispered tokens. We’re disposed to take it that whispered and non-whispered tokens pattern 
alike---being more confident in this than we are in the exact patterns connected to either. So 
our actual psychological reasons for the linguistic acts (and beliefs formed in communicative 
situations) are not sensitive to the whisper/non-whisper distinction.22 
It remains to consider the fluff and malaprop tailors. The underlying challenge here is 
to pinpoint why paradigm conventions are based on simple but exception-prone regularities, 
when there are complex regularities with fewer exceptions that we are in a position to work 
out.  
The Australian regularity driving on the left has exceptions, predictable from our 
general knowledge of the world and each other: we violate the regularity when swerving to 
avoid a Kangaroo, when moving into a parking space on the right, etc. One could tailor a 
“regularity” to which there is more perfect conformity by including the exceptions into the 
specification: “drive on the left except when one swerves to avoid a kangaroo,…”. The latter 
gerrymander doesn’t seem to be a true convention. Why not?   
We can once more appeal to presence. The simple rule remains a reason for us to 
drive left, conditional on varying assumptions about the character of exceptions. We might 
learn that drivers do not react fast enough to swerve to avoid a kangaroo.  That is a useful 
piece of information, but not something that prompts me to recheck my ordinary practical 
reasoning about how to drive in the absence of kangaroos. When kangaroos are around, the 
complex regularity does no better, for it is not a psychological reason for swerving. When I 
do swerve the reason to do so is that if one doesn’t one will have a collision, not a desire to 
conform to some rule. 
																																								 																				
22 This is not to deny that there can be nested conventions, cases where the inner conventions are 
restrictions of an outer, more general convention, perhaps for a larger population.  For example, there 
seem to be specific conventions for speakers with a Leeds accent nested within more general ones for 
speakers with a British accent, nested inside more general conventions still for speakers with a wider 
range of accents.  These nested conventions might feature different types – consider the case of 
“colour”/”color”.   
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In the case of truthfulness and trust, malaprops and fluffs pattern similarly. 
Regularities featuring the type “alligator+” have one fewer exception than the ‘standard’ 
regularities featuring the intuitive word types. However, that gerrymandered typing is not 
anybody’s reason for uttering what they do.  It’s not Mrs Malaprop’s, since she is not aware 
of her idiosyncracy. It’s not our reason when interpreting each other, outside malaprop 
contexts.  We don’t recheck our way of interpreting each other conditional on propositions 
about that utterance of Mrs Malaprop’s. You might think that knowledge of the malaprop 
regularities would be an interpreter’s reason for attributing to Mrs Malaprop an alligator-
belief upon hearing her utter, “Aviators are dangerous reptiles found in the marshes in 
Florida.” But anyone who tried to appeal to that rule would make a mistake about Mrs 
Malaprop’s psychology.  They would be representing her utterance as the rational outcome of 
true beliefs about regularities in usage of a (tailored) word-type, when part of the basic data 
about this case is that she’s either subject to performance-error (so that act-type isn’t 
rationalized by her beliefs) or has false linguistic beliefs that lead to her utterance. Similar 
remarks cover the case of fluffs. So, the psychological presence constraint disqualifies all the 
remaining gerrymanders from being languages.  The threat of overgeneration is allayed. 
There’s a difference between regularities that are not conventions due to violations of 
identifiability, and regularities that are not conventions due to violations of presence. The 
former regularities could not become conventions, unless our powers of recognition were 
enhanced. In the case of presence-violators, it is a contingent fact of psychology that we 
reason one way rather than another. We could base our driving decisions on international 
disjunctive regularities rather than national ones. We could treat “buy”/”purchase” as a 
semantic unit, a variant spelling like “recognize”/”recognise”. One shouldn’t expect the 
abstract metaphysics of words to be the place where an illuminating explanation of why our 
psychology of language codes things one way rather than another---historical linguistics is a 
much better bet for such insight. But our point has been simply to show that the endogenous 
story set out in section 3 was not immediately refuted by crazily overgenerating word types, 
and this has been achieved.23 
7.  
We have set out and defended a new account of sentence-types. Rather than receiving 
																																								 																				
23 One author would also use condition (4) of Lewis’s characterization of convention to demonstrate the non-
conventionality of some of the gerrymandered word-type regularities.   
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some individuative story prior to and independent of our metasemantics, on our theory the 
same factors that fix meaning, fix word-typing. In so-doing, we avoid the problems that beset 
previous accounts of the metaphysics of words, including the widely but unreflectively 
endorsed phonographemic view. Our story explains why the phonographemic view seemed 
so natural: phonographemic factors play a crucial epistemological role in the identifiability of 
our sentence-types.  
The most important worry for our view is that it might overgenerate spurious word-
types. We have explained in detail why, although there are many regularities of truthfulness 
and trust involving spurious typings, there are very few conventional regularities.  
We have given an account of sentence types; it is a further question what individuates 
the lexical items, the basic morphemes out of which sentences are built. A natural extension 
of our account addresses this question. Recall that Lewis held that once we had a grip on 
which language (function from sentence-types to propositions) was in use in a population, we 
would then use this to get a grip on which grammar (syntactical parsing and semantic 
analysis) was in use therein. The grammar in use was the simplest, strongest theory that 
generated the sentence-proposition pairings of a language-in-use. Included in the grammar, in 
our view, will be an assignment of lexical-types to parts of utterances, as well as an 
assignment of syntactical-tree types to whole utterances; a constraint will be that the leafs of 
the tree be lexical types that (if non-null) are instantiated by parts of utterances. The 
requirement for simplicity and strength will ensure that a sensible typing of sentence-types 
will require a sensible typing of constituent word-types, if the grammar is to be used. 
Although our focus has been on the metaphysics of word-types, we have en passant 
given an account of language-using populations. Thus we are able to offer an answer to 
White’s (ms) challenge: that the Lewisian metasemantics is circular because the relevant 
populations cannot be non-circularly specified. White presupposes that the account of 
populations must be exogenous.  
The endogenous theory of word-types allows the naturalistic theory of meaning to 
proceed without the worry that the metasemantic base contains tacit circularities. But the 
flipside is that there is no guarantee that endogenous theories are available for arbitrary 
metasemantics.  Those wishing to deploy a sophisticated variant of the Evans-style dominant-
causal-role metasemantics with which we began still owe us all a (presumably exogenous) 
account of the metaphysics of word-types. Worse for them, the convention-based competitor 
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has discharged their debts in this respect---it can no longer be dismissed as everyone’s 
problem.   
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